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Abstract
We consider the problem of polar coding for secure communications over the two-way wiretap
channel, where two legitimate users communicate with each other simultaneously while a passive
eavesdropper overhears a combination of their exchanged signals. The legitimate users wish to design a
cooperative jamming code such that the interference between their codewords can jam the eavesdropper.
In this paper, we design a polar coded cooperative jamming scheme that achieves the whole secrecy
rate region of the general two-way wiretap channel under the strong secrecy criterion. The chaining
method is used to make proper alignment of polar indices. The randomness required to be shared
between two legitimate users is treated as a limited resource and we show that its rate can be made
negligible by increasing the blocklength and the number of chained blocks. For the special case when the
eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the legitimate ones, a simplified scheme is proposed
which can simultaneously ensure reliability and weak secrecy within a single transmission block. An
example of the binary erasure channel case is given to demonstrate the performance of our scheme.
Index Terms
Polar codes, two-way wiretap channel, coded cooperative jamming, physical-layer security, universal
polar coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner proved in [1] that it is possible to communicate both reliably and securely over a
wiretap channel, on the premise that the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the
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2legitimate channel. Since then, numerous works have been done on showing the existence of
secure coding schemes for different kinds of channels. However, few of these results provide
guidance for designing a specific polynomial-time coding scheme, except for some special cases
[2]–[4]. Polar codes, proposed by Arıkan [5], have demonstrated capacity-achieving property in
both source and channel coding [5]–[9]. The principle that lies behind polar codes is that one can
generate a series of extremal channels (noiseless or purely noisy) from repeated uses of a single-
user channel. The structure of polar codes makes them also suitable for designing secrecy codes.
Polar coding has been studied for wiretap channels [10]–[17], fading wiretap channels [18],
multiple access wiretap channels [19], [20], and broadcast channels with confidential messages
[16], [17]. It is shown that polar codes can achieve the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap
channel under the strong secrecy criterion [16], [17].
The two-way wiretap channel models the situation when two legitimate users communicate
with each other simultaneously in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. In this model, signals
overheard by the eavesdropper are combinations of the exchanged signals between two legitimate
users. This motivates the idea of leveraging interference between two users’ transmitted code-
words to degrade the eavesdropper channel, known as coded cooperative jamming. This problem
was first investigated in [21], and the achievable rate region for the two-way wiretap channel
was derived in [22], [23]. A practical scheme based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) code
was presented in [24], which can guarantee weak secrecy for the special case of binary-input
Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with equal-gained interference.
Note that the eavesdropper sees a 2-user multiple access channel (MAC) in the two-way
wiretap channel. Polar coding for MACs has been studied in [25]–[30]. There are two types of
MAC polarization methods in literature, either synthesizing N uses of the original MAC into
N new extremal MACs [25]–[27], or 2N extremal point-to-point channels [28]–[30]. In our
scheme, we adopt Arıkan’s monotone chain rule expansion method [28] which belongs to the
first type, as it can achieve all points on the dominant face of the achievable rate region of a
MAC without time sharing, and has simple structure and low encoding/decoding complexity.
In this paper, we use polar codes to design a coded cooperative jamming scheme for the
general two-way wiretap channel. The chaining method [31] is used to deal with unaligned
polar indices for the general channel cases. The main contributions of this paper include:
• A polar coded cooperative jamming scheme for the general two-way wiretap channel is
proposed, without any constraint on channel symmetry or degradation. Self interference of
3each user is considered in the code design, making our proposed scheme suitable for a large
variety of channels rather than additive ones. For additive channels, one may assume that
each user’s self interference can be perfectly canceled. However, under a general setting,
this assumption is inappropriate. In this paper, we treat self interference as side information
of legitimate channels, which is involved in the polar code design, encoding and decoding.
• Information theoretical analysis on reliability, secrecy and achievable rate region is per-
formed. Instead of assuming channel prefixing can be done perfectly, we apply polar coding
to do channel prefixing and show that the induced joint distribution of random variables
involved in the coding scheme is asymptotically indistinguishable from the target one. The
amount of randomness required to be shared between two legitimate users is considered as
a limited resource, and we show that its rate can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the
blocklength and chaining sufficient number of blocks in our scheme. By applying MAC
polarization on the eavesdropper channel using different types of monotone chain rule
expansions, we can achieve different secrecy rate pairs. We prove that our proposed scheme
can achieve all points on the dominant face of the secrecy rate region of a two-way wiretap
channel under the strong secrecy criterion.
• A single-block scheme for the special case of degraded two-way wiretap channel is provided.
In the case when the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to both legitimate
channels, we show that with a slight modification, our proposed scheme can achieve the
secrecy rate region under the weak secrecy criterion within a single transmission block.
• An example of the binary erasure channel case is presented to evaluate the performance
of our proposed scheme for different code lengths. The information leakage, block error
rate and secrecy sum rate are estimated for code length 28 to 227. The results confirm the
secrecy rate-achieving capability of our proposed scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the two-way
wiretap channel model and state the problem we investigate. Section III provides some necessary
background on polarization and polar codes. In Section IV we describe details of our proposed
polar coding scheme and analyze its performance. Section V shows a special case when weak
secrecy can be obtained within a single transmission block. Section VI gives an example of the
binary erasure channel case. We conclude this paper in Section VII.
Notation: [N ] denotes the index set of {1, 2, ..., N}. Random variables are denoted by capital
letters X , Y , U , V , ... with values x, y, u, v, ... respectively. For a vector y = (y1, y2, ...yN),
4Fig. 1. The two-way wiretap channel.
yi:j denotes its subvector (yi, ..., yj), and yA (A ⊂ [N ]) denotes its subvector {yi : i ∈ A}. F⊗n
denotes the nth Kronecker power of F. GN = BNF⊗n is the generator matrix of polar codes
[5], where N = 2n is the code length with n being an arbitrary integer, BN is a permutation
matrix known as bit-reversal matrix, and F =
1 0
1 1
.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Channel Model
We consider the secure communication problem in the two-way wiretap channel as illustrated
in Fig. 1. In this model, each of the two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, is equipped with
a transmitter and a receiver. The channel is assumed to be full-duplex, and the two users
communicate with each other simultaneously under the existence of a passive eavesdropper,
Eve. Details of the communications are as follows:
• Alice wants to send a message M1 to Bob at rate R1 over N channel uses, she encodes
M1 into a codeword X1 and transmits it through the channel;
• Bob wants to send a message M2 to Alice at rate R2 also over N channel uses, he encodes
M2 into a codeword X2 and transmits it through the channel;
• Alice observes Y2 from the channel and recovers Mˆ2;
• Bob observes Y1 from the channel and recovers Mˆ1;
• Eve observes Ye.
Definition 1. A memoryless two-way wiretap channel
(X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Ye, PY1Y2Ye|X1X2) consists
of two input alphabets X1 and X2, three output alphabets Y1, Y2 and Ye, and transition
5probability PY1Y2Ye|X1X2 such that
∀(x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2,
∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
∑
ye∈Ye
PY1Y2Ye|X1X2(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2) = 1. (1)
B. Coded Cooperative Jamming
The multiple access nature of the eavesdropper channel renders Alice and Bob an advantage
over Eve, since the combination of their signals may have a detrimental effect on her. In the
multi-user communication scenario, a natural approach to enhance security is to use cooperative
jamming [21]. While one user is transmitting secret messages, the other user transmits artificial
noise to reduce the eavesdropper’s signal-to-noise ratio. In such a scheme, only one user can
transmit useful information at a time. Another approach which overcomes this limitation is
to utilize interference between codewords to jam the eavesdropper. In this case, both users
transmit secret messages simultaneously, and their codewords are elaborately designed so that the
interference between them can confuse the eavesdropper. This scheme is called coded cooperative
jamming [21]. In this paper, we use polar codes to design such a code.
The goal of designing a secure coding scheme for the two-way wiretap channel is to make
sure Eve obtains no (or vanishing) information about M1 and M2 from Ye, while Alice and Bob
can estimate their intended massages correctly. The performance of a coding scheme is assessed
by its reliability and secrecy. For a coding scheme of blocklength N , reliability is measured by
the probability of error
Pe(N) = Pr
{
(Mˆ1, Mˆ2) 6= (M1,M2)
}
. (2)
Secrecy can be measured by the information leakage
L(N) = I(Ye;M1,M2), (3)
or the information leakage rate
LR(N) =
1
N
L(N). (4)
The objective of a secure coding scheme is then:
lim
N→∞
Pe(N) = 0; (5)
lim
N→∞
L(N) = 0 (strong secrecy), or (6)
lim
N→∞
LR(N) = 0 (weak secrecy). (7)
6Criterion (7) is called weak secrecy because it does not guarantee vanishing information
leakage. For some strict situations this is unacceptable. In Section IV we will introduce the
general strong secrecy scheme. In Section V we discuss a special case when weak secrecy can
be achieved within a single transmission block.
C. Achievable Rate Region
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for a two-way wiretap channel under the
strong/weak secrecy criterion if there exists a coding scheme such that (5) and (6)/(7) can be
satisfied. The achievable rate region of this channel is the closure of all achievable rate pairs. For
a two-way wiretap channel with transition probability PY1Y2Ye|X1X2(y1, y2, ye|x1, x2), the secrecy
rate region under the strong (as well as weak) secrecy criterion is [22]
RS(PY1Y2Ye|X1X2) =
⋃
P∈P

 R1
R2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≤ I(Y1;C1|X2)− I(C1;Ye)
R2 ≤ I(Y2;C2|X1)− I(C2;Ye)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(Y1;C1|X2) + I(Y2;C2|X1)
− I(C1, C2;Ye)

, (8)
where
P = {PX1X2C1C2Y1Y2Ye factorizing as: PY1Y2Ye|X1X2PX1|C1PC1PX2|C2PC2}.
III. REVIEW OF POLAR CODING
A. Polar Coding for Asymmetric Channels
In this subsection we review the polar coding scheme proposed in [9] and simplified in
[16], [32] for asymmetric channels. Consider N independent uses of a binary-input discrete
memoryless channel (B-DMC) PY |X(y|x), where X is binary with arbitrary distribution and
Y is defined on an arbitrary countable alphabet. Let U1:N = X1:NGN . For δN = 2−N
β with
β ∈ (0, 1/2), define the following polarized sets:
H(N)X = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i|U1:i−1) ≥ 1− δN}, (9)
L(N)X = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i|U1:i−1) ≤ δN}, (10)
H(N)X|Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i|Y 1:N , U1:i−1) ≥ 1− δN}, (11)
L(N)X|Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i|Y 1:N , U1:i−1) ≤ δN}, (12)
7where Z(X|Y ) is the Bhattacharyya parameter of a random variable pair (X, Y ), defined as
Z(X|Y ) = 2
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)
√
PX|Y (0|y)PX|Y (1|y). (13)
It is shown that [6]
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H(N)X | = H(X), lim
N→∞
1
N
|L(N)X | = 1−H(X),
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H(N)X|Y | = H(X|Y ), limN→∞
1
N
|L(N)X|Y | = 1−H(X|Y ).
(14)
To construct a polar code for W , partition indices of U1:N into the following sets:
I , H(N)X ∩ L(N)X|Y ,
F , H(N)X ∩ (L(N)X|Y )C ,
D , (H(N)X )C .
(15)
Since {ui}i∈I are uniformly distributed and can be reliably decoded, they will be filled with
uniformly distributed information bits. For {ui}i∈F∪D, reference [9] suggests to assign them
by random mappings λIC , {λi}i∈IC that sample distribution PU i|U1:i−1 , which are shared
between the encoder and the decoder. However, Exchanging the shared randomness may heavily
increase the encoder’s overhead since the non-information bits usually form a large portion of the
uncoded bits. A simplified scheme which only requires a vanishing rate of shared randomness
was independently proposed in [16] and [32], which is summarized as follows.
• {ui}i∈I carry uniformly distributed information bits,
• {ui}i∈F are filled with uniformly distributed frozen bits (shared between the encoder and
the decoder),
• {ui}i∈D are assigned by random mappings:
ui =
0 w.p. PU i|U1:i−1(0|u
1:i−1),
1 w.p. PU i|U1:i−1(1|u1:i−1).
• Codeword x1:N = u1:NGN is transmitted to the receiver.
• {ui}
i∈(H(N)X )C∩(L
(N)
X|Y )
C is separately transmitted to the receiver with some reliable error-
correcting code.
8It is shown in [16], [32] that the rate of the shared almost deterministic bits in (H(N)X )C ∩
(L(N)X|Y )C vanishes as N goes large. Having received y1:N and recovered the shared bits, the
receiver decodes u1:N with a successive cancellation (SC) decoder:
u¯i =
u
i, if i ∈ (L(N)X|Y )C
arg maxu∈{0,1} PU i|Y 1:NU1:i−1(u|y1:N , u1:i−1), if i ∈ L(N)X|Y
.
The rate this scheme, R = 1
N
|I|, satisfies
lim
N→∞
R = I(X;Y ), (16)
and the block error probability can be upper bounded by
Pe ≤
∑
i∈L(N)
X|Y
Z(U i|Y 1:N , U1:i−1) = O(N2−Nβ). (17)
B. Polar Coding for Multiple Access Channels
In this subsection we recap the monotone chain rule expansion based MAC polarization method
introduced in [28] and generalized to asymmetric channels in [33]. The achievable rate region
of a binary-input discrete memoryless 2-user MAC PY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) is given by [34]
R(PY |X1X2) =

 R1
R2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )
 . (18)
Define
U1:N1 = X
1:N
1 GN , U
1:N
2 = X
1:N
2 GN , (19)
and let S1:2N = (S1, ..., S2N) be a permutation of U1:N1 U
1:N
2 such that it preserves the relative
order of elements of both U1:N1 and U
1:N
2 , called a monotone chain rule expansion. For i ∈ [2N ],
let bi = 0 represent that Si ∈ U1:N1 , and bi = 1 represent that Si ∈ U1:N2 . Then a monotone
chain rule expansion can be represented by a string b2N = b1b2...b2N , called the path of the
expansion. The mutual information between the receiver and two users can be expanded as
I(Y 1:N ;U1:N1 , U
1:N
2 ) = H(U
1:N
1 , U
1:N
2 )−H(U1:N1 , U1:N2 |Y 1:N)
= NH(X1) +NH(X2)−
2N∑
i=1
H(Si|Y 1:N , S1:i−1),
9and the rate of user j (j = 1, 2) is
RUj = H(Xj)−
1
N
∑
i∈SUj
H(Si|Y 1:N , S1:i−1), (20)
where SUj , {i ∈ [2N ] : Si ∈ U1:Nj }. (RU1 , RU2) is a point on the dominant face of R(PY |X1X2).
It is shown that arbitrary points on the dominant face can be achieved with expansions of type
0i1N0N−i (0 ≤ i ≤ N ) given sufficiently large N [28]. It is also shown that H(Si|Y 1:N , S1:i−1)
(i ∈ [2N ]) polarizes to 0 or 1 as N goes to infinity.
Having selected a specific expansion for a target rate pair, we still need enough code length
to polarize the MAC sufficiently. In order to do so, we need to scale the path. For any integer
l = 2m, let lb2N denote
b1 · · · b1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
b2 · · · b2︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
· · · · · · b2N · · · b2N︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
,
which is a monotone chain rule for U1:lN1 U
1:lN
2 . It is shown in [28] that b2N and lb2N have
the same rate pair. With this result, we can construct a polar code for the 2-user MAC using
point-to-point polar codes. For j = 1, 2, let fj(i) : [N ] → SUj be the mapping from indices of
U1:Nj to those of S
SUj . Define
H(N)SUj , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(S
fj(i)|S1:fj(i)−1) ≥ 1− δN}, (21)
L(N)SUj |Y , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(S
fj(i)|Y 1:N , S1:fj(i)−1) ≤ δN}, (22)
for δN = 2−N
β with β ∈ (0, 1/2). Since X1 and X2 are independent, we have
H(N)SUj = H
(N)
Xj
, {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U ij |U1:i−1j ) ≥ 1− δN}. (23)
Then we can partition indices of U1:Nj into
Ij , H(N)SUj ∩ L
(N)
SUj |Y
,
Fj , H(N)SUj ∩ (L
(N)
SUj |Y
)C ,
Dj , (H(N)SUj )
C ,
(24)
and then apply the polar coding scheme introduced in the previous subsection. The receiver jointly
decodes U1:N1 and U
1:N
2 with a successive cancellation decoder according to the permutation used.
Proposition 1 ( [28]). Let PY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) be the transition probability of a binary-input
memoryless 2-user MAC. Consider the transformation defined in (19). Let N0 = 2n0 for some
10
n0 ≥ 1 and fix a path b2N0 for U1:N01 U1:N02 . The rate pair for b2N0 is denoted by (RU1 , RU2).
Let N = 2lN0 for l ≥ 1 and let S1:2N be the expansion represented by 2lb2N0 . Then, for any
given δ > 0, as l goes to infinity, we have
1
2N
∣∣{i ∈ [2N ] : δ < Z(Si|Y 1:N , S1:i−1) < 1− δ}∣∣→ 0,
|I1|
N
→ RU1 and
|I2|
N
→ RU2 .
(25)
IV. POLAR CODING FOR THE TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. The Proposed Scheme
1) Polarization of Legitimate Channels: For a given PX1X2C1C2Y1Y2Ye ∈ P , define Bob’s
effective channel as
W1(y1|c1, x2) ,
∑
x1
PY1|X1X2(y1|x1, x2)PX1|C1(x1|c1),
and similarly define Alice’s effective channel W2(y2|x1, c2).
Since each legitimate user knows its own transmitted signal, he/she will treat it as side
information while decoding the other user’s message. Let U1:Nj = C
1:N
j GN and V
1:N
j = X
1:N
j GN
for j = 1, 2. For δN = 2−N
β with β ∈ (0, 1/2), define
H(N)C1|X2 , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i1|X1:N2 , U1:i−11 ) ≥ 1− δN},
L(N)C1|Y1X2 , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i1|Y 1:N1 , X1:N2 , U1:i−11 ) ≤ δN}, (26)
H(N)C2|X1 , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i2|X1:N1 , U1:i−12 ) ≥ 1− δN},
L(N)C2|Y2X1 , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i2|Y 1:N2 , X1:N1 , U1:i−12 ) ≤ δN}. (27)
Since two users’ messages are independent, we have
H(N)C1|X2 = H
(N)
C1
, {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i1|U1:i−11 ) ≥ 1− δN},
H(N)C2|X1 = H
(N)
C2
, {i ∈ [N ] : Z(U i2|U1:i−12 ) ≥ 1− δN}.
For conventional two-way communication without secrecy requirement, the information bit
sets are defined as
G1 = H(N)C1|X2 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 , G2 = H
(N)
C2|X1 ∩ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1 .
Since such two polar codes can be seen as MAC polar codes designed for corner points, from
(25) we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|G1| = I(Y1;C1|X2), lim
N→∞
1
N
|G2| = I(Y2;C2|X1). (28)
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To generate the final codeword, one can transmit C1:Nj (j = 1, 2) through a virtual channel with
transition probability PXj |Cj(xj|cj), known as channel prefixing. In practice, channel prefixing
may not be done perfectly. In this paper, we consider Xj and Cj (j = 1, 2) as two correlated
sources and use polar coding to do channel prefixing. Define
H(N)Xj |Cj , {i ∈ [N ] : Z(V ij |C1:Nj , V 1:i−1j ) ≥ 1− δN}. (29)
Once C1:Nj is determined, X
1:N
j can be obtained as follows:
• {vij}i∈H(N)
Xj |Cj
are filled with uniformly distributed random bits,
• {vij}i∈(H(N)
Xj |Cj )
C are assigned by random mappings:
vij =
0 w.p. PV ij |C1:Nj V 1:i−1j (0|c
1:N
j , v
1:i−1
j ),
1 w.p. PV ij |C1:Nj V 1:i−1j (1|c
1:N
j , v
1:i−1
j ).
• Compute x1:Nj = v
1:N
j GN .
2) Polarization of the Eavesdropper Channel: Eve’s effective channel is defined as
We(ye|c1, c2) ,
∑
x1
∑
x2
PYe|X1X2(ye|x1, x2)PX1|C1(x1|c1)PX2|C2(x2|c2),
the achievable rate region of which is given by
R(We) =

 R1
R2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(C1;Ye)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(C2;Ye)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(C1, C2;Ye)
 . (30)
For an arbitrary point PS = (RS1, RS2) on the dominant face of RS(PY1Y2Ye|X1X2), let
Re1 = I(Y1;C1|X2)−RS1, Re2 = I(Y2;C2|X1)−RS2.
Obviously PE , (Re1, Re2) is on the dominant face of R(We). Let S2N be the permutation of
U1:N1 U
1:N
2 that achieves PE in We. For j = 1, 2, define SUj , {i ∈ [2N ] : Si ∈ U1:Nj } and let
fj(i) : [N ] → SUj be the mapping from indices of U1:Nj to those of SSUj . Then we can define
the following polarized sets from Eve’s point of view:
H(N)SUj ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Sfj(i)|S1:fj(i)−1) ≥ 1− δN
}
,
H(N)SUj |Ye ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Sfj(i)|Y 1:Ne , S1:fj(i)−1) ≥ 1− δN
}
, (31)
L(N)SUj |Ye ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Sfj(i)|Y 1:Ne , S1:fj(i)−1) ≤ δN
}
. (32)
12
Fig. 2. Code construction for Alice.
Since two users’ messages are independent from each other, we have
H(N)SUj = H
(N)
Cj
.
Note that we do not assume how Eve decodes by using a specific permutation S2N . The choice
of S2N only determines the secrecy rate allocation between two users. We will show in the next
subsection that our scheme satisfies the strong secrecy criterion whichever permutation we use.
3) Polar Coding for the Two-Way Wiretap Channel: Define the following index sets for Alice,
I1 = H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 ∩H
(N)
SU1 |Ye ,
F1 = H(N)C1 ∩
(L(N)C1|Y1X2)C ∩H(N)SU1 |Ye ,
Ra1 = H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 ∩
(H(N)SU1 |Ye)C ,
Rb1 = H(N)C1 ∩
(L(N)C1|Y1X2)C ∩ (H(N)SU1 |Ye)C ,
D1 =
(H(N)C1 )C ,
(33)
as illustrated in Fig. 2, and similarly define I2, F2, Ra2, Rb2 and D2 for Bob. We take U1:N1 as an
example to show the code design. Since {ui1}i∈I1 are reliable to Bob, but very unreliable to Eve,
they can carry secret information. {ui1}i∈F1 are unreliable to both of them, thus should be filled
with frozen bits. {ui1}i∈Ra1 are reliable to both of them, therefore should not carry any secret
information. Instead, they will be filled with uniformly distributed random bits. {ui1}i∈Rb1 are
reliable to Eve but unreliable to the Bob, which poses a problem to the code design. They should
serve as frozen bits for Bob while being secured from Eve. A commonly adopted method to
13
Fig. 3. The chaining scheme.
solve this problem is the chaining method [31], which will be described in detail below. {ui}i∈D1
are the almost deterministic bits to be generated by random mappings.
The key point of the assignment for bits in Rb1 and Rb2 is to find a way to ensure their
randomness with respect to the eavesdropper and definiteness with respect to the legitimate users
simultaneously. Suppose |I1| > |Rb1| and |I2| > |Rb2| (corresponding to the positive secrecy rate
case). Choose a subset Ib1 of I1 such that |Ib1| = |Rb1|, and a subset Ib2 of I2 such that |Ib2| = |Rb2|.
Denote Ia1 = I1 \Ib1 and Ia2 = I2 \Ib2. Consider a series of m transmission blocks. Ib1 (resp. Ib2)
in the kth (1 ≤ k < m) block is chained to Rb1 (resp. Rb2) in the (k + 1)th block in the sense
that bits in them share the same value. In the kth block, Alice and Bob can decode Ib1 and Ib2
respectively while Eve can not, which will provide bit values for Rb1 and Rb2 in the (k + 1)th
block and serve as frozen bits. To initiate the transmission, Alice and Bob should share two
secret seed sequences of length |Rb1| and |Rb2| respectively. The chaining scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 3. The seed rate of this scheme,
Rseed =
|Rb1|+ |Rb2|
2mN
,
can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently large m. Details of the encoding and
decoding procedures are as follows.
Encoding:
In the 1st block, Alice encodes her message as follows:
• {ui1}i∈Ia1 carry uniformly distributed secret information bits,
• {ui1}i∈Ra1∪Ib1 are filled with uniformly distributed random bits,
14
• {ui1}i∈Rb1 carry uniformly distributed secret seed shared only between two users,
• {ui1}i∈F1 are filled with uniformly distributed frozen bits (known by everyone, including
Eve),
• {ui1}i∈D1 are assigned by random mappings:
ui1 =
0 w.p. PU i|U1:i−11 (0|u
1:i−1
1 ),
1 w.p. PU i|U1:i−11 (1|u
1:i−1
1 ).
• The final codeword is generated as described in Section IV-A1.
• {ui1}i∈(H(N)C1 )C∩(L(N)C1|Y1X2 )C is separately and secretly transmitted to Bob with some reliable
error-correcting code.
In the kth (1 < k ≤ m) block, {ui1}i∈Rb1 are assigned with the same value as {ui1}i∈Ib1 in the
(k − 1)th block, and the rest bits are encoded in the same way as in the 1st block.
Bob encodes its message similarly by replacing subscript 1 by 2.
Although our scheme requires separate secret communications between two users, we will
show in the next subsection that the rate of them vanishes as the blocklength goes large.
Decoding:
Having received y1:N1 and recovered {ui1}i∈(H(N)C1 )C∩(L(N)C1|Y1X2 )C , Bob decodes Alice’s message
as follows:
In the 1st block,
u¯i1 =
u
i
1, if i ∈ (L(N)C1|Y1X2)C
arg maxu∈{0,1} PU i1|Y 1:N1 X1:N2 U1:i−11 (u|y1:N1 , x1:N2 , u¯
1:i−1
1 ), if i ∈ L(N)C1|Y1X2
.
In the kth (1 < k ≤ m) block, {u¯i1}i∈Rb1 are deduced from {u¯i1}i∈Ib1 in the (k − 1)th block,
and the rest bits are decoded same as in the 1st block.
Alice decodes Bob’s message similarly by swapping subscripts 1 and 2.
B. Performance
1) Total Variation Distance: First, we show that the induced joint distribution by our encoding
scheme is asymptotically indistinguishable from the target one. The target joint distribution of
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polarized variables U1:N1 V
1:N
1 U
1:N
2 V
1:N
2 can be decomposed as
PU1:N1 V 1:N1 U1:N2 V 1:N2 (u
1:N
1 , v
1:N
1 , u
1:N
2 , v
1:N
2 )
= PU1:N1 (u
1:N
1 )PV 1:N1 |U1:N1 (v
1:N
1 |u1:N1 )PU1:N2 (u1:N2 )PV 1:N2 |U1:N2 (v1:N2 |u1:N2 )
=
N∏
i=1
P (ui1|u1:i−11 )P (vi1|v1:i−11 , u1:N1 )P (ui2|u1:i−12 )P (vi2|v1:i−12 , u1:N2 ).
According to our encoding rules, the induced joint distribution is
QU1:N1 V 1:N1 U1:N2 V 1:N2 (u
1:N
1 , v
1:N
1 , u
1:N
2 , v
1:N
2 )
=
N∏
i=1
Q(ui1|u1:i−11 )Q(vi1|v1:i−11 , u1:N1 )Q(ui2|u1:i−12 )Q(vi2|v1:i−12 , u1:N2 ),
where for j = 1, 2,
Q(uij|u1:i−1j ) ,

1
2
, if i ∈ H(N)Cj ,
P (uij|u1:i−1j ), otherwise.
from our encoding scheme, and
Q(vij|v1:i−1j , u1:Nj ) ,

1
2
, if i ∈ H(N)Xj |Cj ,
P (vij|v1:i−1j , u1:Nj ), otherwise.
from our channel prefixing scheme. From [35, Lemma 5]1 we have
‖ PU1:N1 V 1:N1 U1:N2 V 1:N2 −QU1:N1 V 1:N1 U1:N2 V 1:N2 ‖≤ O(N2−N
β
), (34)
where ‖ P −Q ‖ denotes the total variation distance between distributions P and Q. Since U1:Nj
and V 1:Nj are linear transformations of C
1:N
j and X
1:N
j , respectively, we can readily derive from
the definition of total variational distance that
‖ Pall −Qall ‖≤ O(N2−Nβ), (35)
where Pall is the target joint distribution of random variables C1:N1 X
1:N
1 C
1:N
2 X
1:N
2 Y
1:N
1 Y
1:N
2 Y
1:N
e ,
and Qall is the induced one by our encoding scheme.
1Although there are differences in the number of random variables and encoding rules between the scheme in [35, Lemma 5]
and ours, one can readily verify from their proof that this conclusion still holds if we replace M(n)1 and M(n)2 in [35, Lemma
5] respectively with H(N)Xj |Cj and H
(N)
Cj
defined in this paper and apply the chain rule on the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
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2) Reliability: Let P (k)e1 and P
(k)
e2 respectively be the block error probability of Bob’s and
Alice’s decoder in the kth block under the assumption that the exact value of all frozen bits
(including those to be deduced from the previous block) is provided. From [9] we have
P
(k)
e1 ≤‖ PC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:N1 −QC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:N1 ‖ +
∑
i∈L(N)
C1|Y1X2
Z(U i1|Y 1:N1 , X1:N2 , U1:i−11 )
= O(N2−N
β
),
and similarly P (k)e2 ≤ O(N2−Nβ). Then the error probability of the overall m transmission blocks
can be upper bounded by
Pe ≤
m∑
k=1
P
(k)
e1 +
m∑
k=1
P
(k)
e2 = O(mN2
−Nβ). (36)
3) Secrecy: In the kth (1 ≤ k ≤ m) block, denote Alice’s secret message bits at Ia1 by
M1,k, random bits at Ib1 by E1,k, and frozen bits at F1 by F1,k. Bits at Rb1 in the kth block
are equal to those at E1,k−1, with E1,0 being the secret seed. M2,k, E2,k and F2,k are similarly
defined for Bob’s message. Eve’s channel output in the kth block is denoted by Ye,k. For
brevity, denote Mk , (M1,k,M2,k), Ek , (E1,k,E2,k), Fk , {F1,k,F2,k}, Mk , {M1, ...,Mk},
Ek , {E1, ...,Ek}, Fk , {F1, ...,Fk}, and Yke , {Ye,1, ...,Ye,k}.
Lemma 1. For any k ∈ [m], we have
I(Mk,Ek;Ye,k|Fk) = O(N32−Nβ). (37)
Proof. Let t = |I1| + |I2| and w = |F1| + |F2|. Denote {a1, a2, ..., at} = {f1(i1), f2(i2) : i1 ∈
I1, i2 ∈ I2} with a1 < ... < at, {b1, b2, ..., bw} = {f1(i1), f2(i2) : i1 ∈ F1, i2 ∈ F2} with
b1 < ... < bw, and {c1, c2, ..., ct+w} = {a1, ..., at, b1, ..., bw} with c1 < ... < ct+w. Then we have
I(Mk,Ek;Ye,k|Fk)
= H(Mk,Ek|Fk)−H(Mk,Ek|Ye,k,Fk)
= H(Mk,Ek)−H(Mk,Ek,Fk|Ye,k) +H(Fk|Ye,k)
=
t∑
i=1
H(Sai |Sa1 , ..., Sai−1)−
t+w∑
i=1
H(Sci |Ye,k, Sc1 , ..., Sci−1) +
w∑
i=1
H(Sbi |Ye,k, Sb1 , ..., Sbi−1)
≤
t+w∑
i=1
(
1−H(Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1)
)
, (38)
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where (38) holds because H(Sci |Ye,k, Sc1 , ..., Sci−1) ≥ H(Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1). Note that the en-
tropy here is calculated under the induced distribution by our encoding scheme. To estimate
I(Mk,Ek;Ye,k|Fk) correctly, let HP (Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1) denote the entropy under the target dis-
tribution PC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:N1 Y 1:N2 Y 1:Ne . According to (31), (33) and [6, Proposition 2] we have
HP (S
ci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1) ≥ Z(Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1)2 ≥ (1− δN)2 = 1−O(2−Nβ+1). (39)
From [34, Theorem 17.3.3] we have
|H(Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1)−HP (Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1)|
≤ − ‖ PC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:Ne −QC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:Ne ‖ ×
log
‖ PC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:Ne −QC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:Ne ‖
|Ye|N22N
= O(N22−N
β
) +O(Nβ+12−N
β
). (40)
From (39) and (40) we have
H(Sci |Ye,k, S1:ci−1) ≥ 1−O(N22−Nβ).
Thus,
I(Mk,Ek;Ye,k|Fk) ≤ O(N32−Nβ). (41)
Suppose Eve has the knowledge of all frozen bits. The information leakage of our scheme is
L(N) = I(Mm;Yme |Fm)
≤ I(Mm,Em;Yme |Fm)
= I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm,Em;Ym−1e |Fm,Ye,m)
= I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm,Em;Ym−1e |Fm,Ye,m) (42)
≤ I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm,Em,Ye,m;Ym−1e |Fm)
≤ I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm,Em−1,Em,Ye,m;Ym−1e |Fm)
= I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm−1,Em−1;Ym−1e |Fm), (43)
= I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm−1,Em−1;Ym−1e |Fm−1), (44)
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where (42) and (43) are due to the fact that Mm−1 → (Mm,Em)→ Ye,m and (Mm,Em,Ye,m)→
(Mm−1,Em−1) → Ym−1e form two Markov chains conditioned on Fm. For (44), by the chain
rule for mutual information, we have
I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) = I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) + I(Mm,Em;Fm−1|Fm,Ye,m)
− I(Mm,Em;Fm−1|Fm).
One can readily verify that no matter we reuse the frozen bits in each block or not, the latter
two items in the above equation always equal to 0. Thus,
I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm) = I(Mm,Em;Ye,m|Fm).
Using a similar analysis we can show that
I(Mm−1,Em−1;Ym−1e |Fm) = I(Mm−1,Em−1;Ym−1e |Fm−1).
By induction hypothesis we have
I(Mm;Yme |Fm) ≤
m∑
k=1
I(Mk,Ek;Ye,k|Fk) + I(E0;Ye,0), (45)
where I(E0;Ye,0) is Eve’s knowledge about the secret seeds, which should be 0 in a secure
coding scheme. From Lemma 1 we have
I(Mm;Yme |Fm) ≤ O(mN32−N
β
), (46)
which means limN→∞ L(N) = 0.
4) Achievable Rate Region:
Theorem 1. The coding scheme described in Section IV-A achieves the whole secrecy rate region
of the two-way wiretap channel defined in (8) under the strong secrecy criterion.
Proof. From the previous subsection we can see that the secrecy rate pair of our scheme is
R1 =
1
N
(|I1| − |Rb1|)
=
1
N
(|I1 ∪Ra1| − |Rb1 ∪Ra1|)
=
1
N
(
|H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2| − |H
(N)
C1
∩ (H(N)SU1 |Ye)C |),
R2 =
1
N
(
|H(N)C2 ∩ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1| − |H
(N)
C2
∩ (H(N)SU2 |Ye)C |).
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From (28) we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2| = I(Y1;C1|X2), limN→∞
1
N
|H(N)C2 ∩ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1| = I(Y2;C2|X1).
From (25) we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H(N)SU1 ∩ L
(N)
SU1 |Ye| = Re1, limN→∞
1
N
|H(N)SU2 ∩ L
(N)
SU2 |Ye| = Re2.
Since H(N)SUj = H
(N)
Cj
and
lim
N→∞
1
N
|(H(N)SUj |Ye ∪ L(N)SUj |Ye)C | = 0
for j = 1, 2 by [36, Lemma 1], we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|H(N)C1 ∩
(H(N)SU1 |Ye)C | = Re1, limN→∞ 1N |H(N)C2 ∩ (H(N)SU2 |Ye)C | = Re2.
Thus,
lim
N→∞
R1 = I(Y1;C1|X2)−Re1 = RS1, lim
N→∞
R2 = I(Y2;C2|X1)−Re2 = RS2. (47)
Since (RS1, RS2) is an arbitrary point on the dominant face of RS(PY1Y2Ye|X1X2), we can say
that the whole secrecy rate region is achievable.
5) Rate of Shared Randomness: We further discuss the rate of shared randomness required
in our scheme. As we have shown, the randomized frozen bits only need to be independently
and uniformly distributed and can be known by Eve, they thus can be reused over blocks2. In
our scheme, suppose each user uses the same frozen bits over m chained blocks. Then the rate
of the shared frozen bits is
RF =
|F1|+ |F2|
2mN
. (48)
Since |F1|+ |F2| = O(N), we can see that RF can be made arbitrarily small by choosing suffi-
ciently large m. Besides, they can actually be generated without sacrificing any transmission rate.
For example, all communicators (including the eavesdropper) can use the same pseudorandom
generator (PRG) to produce the same pseudorandom frozen bits by inputing the same seed to
the PRG, such as the current time.
2To prove it rigorously, with a similar analysis to the proof of [37, Lemma 8], we can obtain ‖ Pm − Qm ‖≤
O(mN2−N
β
), where Pm and Qm respectively are the target joint distribution and induced joint distribution of random variables
C1:N1 X
1:N
1 C
1:N
2 X
1:N
2 Y
1:N
1 Y
1:N
2 Y
1:N
e in the overall m blocks when the frozen bits are reused. Thus, the error probability still
vanishes as N goes to infinity. Since we assume that Eve knows the frozen bits, reusing them also does not harm security.
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The rate of the shared almost deterministic bits which need to be separately and secretly
exchanged after each transmission block is
RD =
1
2N
(|(H(N)C1 )C ∩ (L(N)C1|Y1X2)C |+ |(H(N)C2 )C ∩ (L(N)C2|Y2X1)C |). (49)
Similar to the point-to-point channel case introduced in Section III-A, we have lim
N→∞
RD = 0.
Recall from Section IV-A3 that the secrecy seed rate Rseed can also be made arbitrarily small
with large m. From the above we can conclude that the overall rate of shared randomness required
in our scheme can be made negligible by using sufficiently long blocklength and sufficient
number of chained blocks.
V. SPECIAL CASE: ACHIEVING WEAK SECRECY WITHIN A SINGLE TRANSMISSION BLOCK
In the traditional one-way wiretap channel, as has been shown in [12], [13], if the eavesdropper
channel is degraded with respect to the main channel, the reliable bit set of a polar code designed
for the eavesdropper channel will be a subset of that for the main channel [7], and the secrecy
capacity can be achieved under the weak secrecy criterion within a single transmission block.
In the two-way wiretap channel, a similar case also exists.
Definition 2. Let P1 : X1×X2 → Y1 and P2 : X1×X2 → Y2 be two discrete memoryless multiple
access channels, then we say P2 is degraded with respect to P1 (denoted by P1  P2) if there
exists a third channel P3 : Y1 → Y2 such that P2(y2|x1, x2) =
∑
y1∈Y1 P1(y1|x1, x2)P3(y2|y1)
for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2 and y2 ∈ Y2.
Lemma 2. If PY1|C1,C2  PYe|C1,C2 and PY2|C1,C2  PYe|C1,C2 , then we have
L(N)SU1 |Ye ⊆ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 , L
(N)
SU2 |Ye ⊆ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1 , (50)
where L(N)SU1 |Ye and L
(N)
SU2 |Ye are defined in (32), and L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 and L
(N)
C2|Y2X1 are defined in (26)
and (27).
Proof. Since S1:2N is a permutation of U1:N1 U
1:N
2 , we have
Z(Sf1(i)|Y 1:Ne , S1:f1(i)−1) ≥ Z(U i1|Y 1:Ne , U1:N2 , U1:i−11 ).
And since (C1, C2)→ (C1, X2)→ Y1 forms a Markov chain, we have
Z(U i1|Y 1:N1 , U1:N2 , U1:i−11 ) ≥ Z(U i1|Y 1:N1 , X1:N2 , U1:i−11 ).
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Fig. 4. Code construction for Alice in the degraded case.
If PY1|C1,C2  PYe|C1,C2 , then [7, Lemma 4.7]
Z(U i1|Y 1:N1 , U1:N2 , U1:i−11 ) ≤ Z(U i1|Y 1:Ne , U1:N2 , U1:i−11 ).
Thus,
Z(U i1|Y 1:N1 , X1:N2 , U1:i−11 ) ≤ Z(Sf1(i)|Y 1:Ne , S1:f1(i)−1).
From the definitions of the polarized sets we can see that L(N)SU1 |Ye ⊆ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 . Similarly we can
show that L(N)SU2 |Ye ⊆ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1 .
In this special case, we partition indices of U1:N1 into four sets:
I1 = H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 ∩
(L(N)SU1 |Ye)C ,
F1 = H(N)C1 ∩
(L(N)C1|Y1X2)C ∩ (L(N)SU1 |Ye)C ,
R1 = H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 ∩ L
(N)
SU1 |Ye ,
D1 =
(H(N)C1 )C ,
(51)
as illustrated in Fig. 4. Similarly, indices of U1:N2 are partitioned into I2, F2, R2 and D2.
The coding scheme is then simple. I1 and I2 carry information bits, R1 and R2 are filled
with random bits, F1 and F2 carry frozen bits, and D1 and D2 are determined with random
mappings. Similar to the strong secrecy scheme, a vanishing fraction of the deterministic bits,
{ui1}i∈(H(N)C1 )C∩(L(N)C1|Y1X2 )C and {u
i
2}i∈(H(N)C2 )C∩(L(N)C2|Y2X1 )C , are secretly exchanged between Alice
and Bob.
Theorem 2. If the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to both legitimate channels, the
coding scheme described in this section achieves all points on the dominant face of the secrecy
rate region of the two-way wiretap channel defined in (8) under the weak secrecy criterion.
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Proof. Reliability: In the weak secrecy scheme, the total variation distance and the error prob-
ability can be analyzed similarly to the strong secrecy one (except that there is no chaining).
Thus, (35) also holds, and
Pe(N) ≤ O(N2−Nβ). (52)
Secrecy: Since in this section we only consider a single transmission block, we drop the
subscripts and superscripts for block numbers in notations used in Section IV-B3. Similar to
(38), the information leakage can be upper bounded by
I(M;Ye|F) = H(M)−H(M,F|Ye) +H(F|Ye)
≤
∑
i∈A
(
1−H(Si|Ye,k, S1:i−1)
)
, (53)
where
A = {f1(i1), f2(i2) : i1 ∈ I1 ∪ F1, i2 ∈ I2 ∪ F2}.
From (51) we have Ij ∪ Fj = H(N)C1 ∩
(L(N)SU1 |Ye)C for j = 1, 2. Define
B = {f1(i1), f2(i2) : i1 ∈ H(N)C1 ∩H
(N)
SU1 |Ye , i2 ∈ H
(N)
C2
∩H(N)SU2 |Ye},
and let HP (Si|Ye,k, S1:i−1) denote the entropy of Si conditioned on (Ye,k, S1:i−1) under the
target distribution PC1:N1 X1:N1 C1:N2 X1:N2 Y 1:N1 Y 1:N2 Y 1:Ne . Then∑
i∈A
HP (S
i|Ye,k, S1:i−1) =
∑
i∈B
HP (S
i|Ye,k, S1:i−1) +
∑
i∈A\B
HP (S
i|Ye,k, S1:i−1)
≥
∑
i∈B
Z(Si|Ye,k, S1:i−1)2 +
∑
i∈A\B
Z(Si|Ye,k, S1:i−1)2 (54)
≥ |B|(1− δN)2 + (|A| − |B|)δ2N ,
where (54) holds from [6, Proposition 2]. From (40) we have∑
i∈A
H(Si|Ye,k, S1:i−1) ≥ |B|(1− δN)2 + (|A| − |B|)δ2N −O(N32−N
β
).
Thus, the information leakage rate can be upper bounded by
LR(N) =
1
N
I(M;Ye|F)
≤ 1
N
(|A| − |B|+ 2|B|δN − |A|δ2N +O(N32−Nβ)). (55)
Since |A| − |B| = |A \ B| = o(N) by [36, Lemma 1], we have
lim
N→∞
LR(N) = 0. (56)
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Achievable rate region: Since L(N)SU1 |Ye ⊆ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2 and L
(N)
SU2 |Ye ⊆ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1 , we have
R1 =
1
N
|H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
C1|Y1X2| −
1
N
|H(N)C1 ∩ L
(N)
SU1 |Ye|,
R2 =
1
N
|H(N)C2 ∩ L
(N)
C2|Y2X1| −
1
N
|H(N)C2 ∩ L
(N)
SU2 |Ye|.
We can then use a similar analysis to the strong secrecy case and show that this scheme
achieves all points on the dominant face of RS(PY1Y2Ye|X1X2). For conciseness we omit it here.
Now we have finished the proof for Theorem 2.
VI. EXAMPLE: BINARY ERASURE CHANNELS
In this section, we present an example to show the performance of our scheme. For simplicity,
all channels are assumed to be binary erasure MACs, defined as
Y =
X1 +X2 w.p. 1− ? w.p.  , (57)
and the channel inputs are assumed to be uniformly distributed. The erasure probabilities of Bob’s
observed channel W1(Y1|X1X2), Alice’s observed channel W2(Y2|X1X2) and Eve’s observed
channel We(Y1|X1X2) are 1 = 0.2, 2 = 0.3 and e = 0.4 respectively. For the auxiliary
random variables in (8), we consider C1 = X1 and C2 = X2. In this case, the achievable rate
region of the eavesdropper MAC is
0 ≤ Re1 ≤ RU = 1− e = 0.6
0 ≤ Re2 ≤ RV = 1− e = 0.6
Re1 +Re2 ≤ Csum = 1.5(1− e) = 0.9
. (58)
Since each user knows its own transmitted message, two legitimate channels can be simplified
to two BECs with erasure probabilities 1 and 2 respectively. Then the secrecy rate region of
this two-way wiretap channel is
0 ≤ R1 ≤ (1− 1)− (Csum −RV ) = 0.5
0 ≤ R2 ≤ (1− 2)− (Csum −RU) = 0.4
R1 +R2 ≤ Rs , (1− 1) + (1− 2)− Csum = 0.6
.
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Fig. 5. Upper bound for the information leakage.
For BECs, Bhattacharyya parameters Z(W (i)1,N) and Z(W
(i)
2,N) can be easily calculated by [5]
Z(W
(2i−1)
j,N ) = 2Z(W
(i)
j,N/2)− Z(W (i)j,N/2)2, Z(W (2i)j,N ) = Z(W (i)j,N/2)2,
with Z(W (1)j,1 ) = j for j = 1, 2, where Z(W
(i)
j,N) is short for Z(U
i
j |Y 1:Nj , U1:i−1j ).
For the eavesdropper MAC, we take a corner point of its achievable rate region, (0.6, 0.3),
as an example. The secrecy rate pair in this case is (0.5, 0.1).The Bhattacharyya parameters in
the corner point case can be easily calculated since the MAC can be split into two single-user
channels. For points between two corner points, a Monte Carlo approach can be used [5]. Let
We1(Ye|X1) be the channel from Alice to Eve when X2 is known to Eve, and We2(Ye|X2) the
channel from Bob to Eve when X1 is treated as noise. It is easy to verify that Bhattacharyya
parameters for We1 and We2 are the same as those for We1(Ye|X1).
The upper bound for information leakage can be deduced from (38) and (45) that
I(Mm;Yme |Fm) ≤ m
∑
i∈I∪F
(
1− Z(Si|Y 1:Ne , S1:i−1)2
)
, (59)
where I and F respectively are the information bit set and the frozen bit set with respect to
S1:2N . Once we are able to obtain the Bhattacharyya parameters for all synthesized channels, the
upper bound for block error rate can be evaluated by (36), and that for the information leakage
can be estimated using (59). Since the number of transmission blocks m is only a multiplier
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Fig. 6. Upper bound for the block error rate.
Fig. 7. The secrecy sum rate of our proposed scheme.
when estimating the information leakage and block error rate, we choose m = 1 without loss
of generality.
The parameter δN = 2−N
β (0 < β < 0.5) in the definitions of polarized sets plays an important
role in the code design. The larger β is, the smaller L(N) and Pe(N) will be for a given N .
However, the secret sum rate will be smaller correspondingly. In this example, we choose several
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β values and compare their differences in performance. Fig. 5, 6 and 7 respectively show the
information leakage upper bound, block error rate upper bound and secrecy sum rate of our
proposed scheme. The result meets our theoretical analysis that, as the code length increases,
the information leakage and block error rate vanish while the secrecy sum rate approaches
Rs = 0.6.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have introduced polar codes into the problem of coded cooperative jamming in
the two-way wiretap channel, and proposed a strong secrecy-achieving scheme for the general
case and a weak secrecy-achieving scheme for the degraded case. The monotone chain rule
expansion based MAC polarization method is used to allocate different secrecy rates between
two users. How to determine the exact code construction for an arbitrary rate pair in an arbitrary
two-way wiretap channel might be a difficult task in our proposed scheme, since it is not clear
whether the existing efficient construction methods for point-to-point polar codes can be readily
applied to the monotone chain rule expansion based MAC polar codes yet. A remedy for this
problem is to use the other type of MAC polarization method mentioned in Section I, for which
efficient constructing methods do exist (e.g., [38], [39]). Although there will be some loss in
achievable rate region with this approach, the sum capacity is still achievable.
Although we only considered binary-input case in this paper, the result can be readily extended
to arbitrary prime alphabet cases with the result of [40].
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